Q: Like what?
A: Well, there’s the legal one, which is the basis of their court case. Unless the CJEU finds that the game is more than just business — aka, it’s somehow part of European culture and social fabric, and therefore ought to be protected — under competition law as it is written, I’m told they have a strong case.
They also have a point when they say UEFA didn’t do enough to put controls on spending and to enforce those controls. Clubs like Manchester City (2014) and Paris Saint-Germain (2014, 2022) were found guilty of breaching Financial Fair Play and it didn’t seem to affect them. City were also banned from European competition for two years by UEFA for cooking the books and breaching FFP, in 2020 only for the ban to be overturned by the Court of Arbitration for Sport a few months later. (CAS did find them guilty of obstructing a “lesser charge.”)
I think that argument will resonate with fans of traditional big clubs who, to this day, believe City and PSG got off lightly, but even that comes with an asterisk.
Q: How so?
A: It’s true that UEFA failed to prove their case with CAS and that the 2014 breaches weren’t dealt with harshly. But it’s equally true that, to some degree, Europe’s big clubs — including the remaining Super League three — could have done more to ensure the process was transparent and that UEFA would take a harder line, and perhaps one that was bulletproof to being overturned by CAS in City’s case.
After all, UEFA derives much of its revenue from the Champions League and every cycle, Europe’s top clubs negotiate with UEFA as to how that money will be distributed. They certainly had the clout to demand harsher rules, more transparency and stiffer punishments — heck, Juventus president Andrea Agnelli was in charge of the European Club Association and sat on UEFA’s Executive Committee from 2017 to 2021. But they didn’t, possibly because it suited them to have clubs like PSG and City inserting liquidity into the transfer market.
Q: Is that a valid argument? The Premier League did far outspend everybody else in the past transfer window, didn’t they?
A: They did, though to be fair, it probably has to do with the fact that they have the second-highest average attendance of any European league and three times the TV revenue of other top leagues. Not to mention you have hedge funds in other countries, too, and for a number of reasons, several of continental Europe’s traditional big clubs were hit harder by the pandemic than others. But the reference to “public investment funds, sheikhs and oligarchs” seems an obvious reference to Newcastle United, Manchester City and Chelsea (at least when Roman Abramovich was still around).
That’s the sort of language that will resonate with fans of Europe’s traditional big clubs, except it’s not clear how some sort of Super League would fix this. Also, given that six of the 12 original Super League clubs came from the Premier League, I’m not sure why they would forgo their dominant position, unless they come up with some sort of competition format that is far, far more lucrative than what they have now… and maybe with a guarantee that there will be place for them in it every year. (Right now, the Premier League has a “Big Six,” but only four places in the Champions League.)
Q: But don’t the Super League insist that theirs won’t be a “closed competition” like it was when they first proposed it back in April 2021?
A: Yes, although “open competition” can mean many things. Euroleague basketball has often been described as a model favoured by Perez (and, indeed, Real Madrid are a part of it, as are Bayern and Barcelona). It’s “open” in the sense that anyone can apply for a “long-term licence” to play in it and if it’s granted (based on a set of requirements, like the size of their home arena) they don’t have to worry about qualifying. In all, 12 clubs have long-term licences, four clubs have short-term “wild card” licences and two qualify via European competitions.
